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ABSTRACT 
The study examines the socio-economic determinants of the performance of 
the new land cooperatives, where the main aim of the study is to test the existence of 
those determinants in Egypt. 
 
The paper starts with an introduction that highlights the economic impact of 
the cooperative business sector and the importance of the economic performance of 
the productive cooperatives of new lands. 
Then part (I) addresses theoretical background about the agricultural cooperative 
theory, then part (II) provides a review of the previous literature, while part (III) 
illustrates the methodological procedures followed in this paper. Part (IV) shows the 
valuation metrics. Finally, part (V) is the conclusion which summarizes the findings 
of the paper. 
 
Cooperative businesses are indisputably an important part of the Egyptian 
economy. The term cooperative means an autonomous association of people united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations 
through jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise. 
 
Consequently; the impact of cooperatives performance is an indication of the 
perceived importance of this sector to the national economy through the cooperatives 
roles on community development, production services, technical support, financial 
responsibilities and social activities. Accordingly the study aims to identifying the 
socioeconomic determinants of the performance of the new lands cooperatives. 
 
The study applied is the multidimensional ILO/DANIDA scale of cooperative 
performance including the equity capital ratio, reserve capital ratio, return on total 
capital, and return on operating assets, return on equity capital and return on operating 
capital. Using he socioeconomic variables: goal attainment, self reliant ratio, 
marketing, annual sales, technical support, finance, training and communication.  
The study was carried out on Alexandria and El-Behira governorates, and data 
were collected by personal interviews using a pre tested questionnaire from 61  
cooperatives using a random proportionate stratified sample. The questionnaire was 
coded and data were statistically analyzed applying the discriminate analysis. 
 
The findings displays the significant positive association ship between the 
cooperative performance and the communication, self reliance ratio, annual sales and 
finance of productive projects (including the industrial, agricultural, commercial 
services), Increasing of marketing opportunities( local market and export)  and 
Cooperative technical support. Finally the 62.3% of the studied cases were correctly 
classified. 
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I- Introduction 
A measure of the economic impact of the cooperative business sector would 
be useful for many groups as they justify their investment in cooperative 
development. The productive cooperatives of new lands are interested in estimates of 
the business volume and economic impacts of the broad cooperative sector. These 
associations can use information to underscore the importance of their membership 
and to justify political support. Leaders of new lands communities are often involved 
with attracting or developing value-added cooperative businesses. These individuals 
are interested in forecasting economic impact to justify incentive packages. Finally, 
economists and other scholars are interested in determining whether cooperatives 
generate a different level of economic impact relative to alternative forms of business 
organizations. 
 
The size and economic impact of the cooperative business sector is not fully 
appreciated because no complete information currently exists about the performance 
of new lands cooperatives, their savings, investment, credits and economic impact, or 
a readily identifiable procedure for gathering this information. 
 
Measuring the economic performance of the productive cooperatives of new 
lands would be an important contribution for several reasons. First, such a measure 
will provide valuable insight for policy makers and the cooperative community about 
the magnitude of the sector’s impact. By cataloging the population of cooperatives, 
estimating their economic impact, and comparing it with alternative business models a 
clear statement of their importance and unique role in the local, regional, and national 
economy can be made. For example, productive cooperatives of new lands tend to be 
locally owned and transfer the benefits of that ownership to the local community. This 
potentially generates a greater economic impact than businesses that are not locally 
owned and which distribute the benefits of ownership outside the community where 
business is conducted. Policy makers, therefore, are interested to know if there is a 
difference in the economic impact of user-owned and investor-owned businesses and 
how great that difference might be. 
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Second, given the dedication of multiple resources to the new lands of, such as 
the local units, community development associations and the bank of development 
and agriculture credit and other national programs, research is needed to measure the 
national implications of such programs, specifically through the economic impact of 
the productive cooperatives, on the new lands. Dedicated efforts to measure the 
economic impact of cooperatives reinforces the fact that they contribute to the new 
lands economy.  
 
Third, quantifying the importance of cooperatives in many different sectors, 
not just the productive cooperatives, will provide specific results that can be used to 
educate the public and policymakers less familiar with cooperatives about their 
impact throughout the nation.  
 
Fourth, the measures of economic impact by cooperatives and other types of 
business models, such as investor-owned companies, can be compared, providing 
information to policymakers and investors as to the difference in impact between 
user- and investor-owned businesses.  
 
Finally, by creating an accurate measure of the impact of cooperatives in the 
economy, analysis could be performed, using these results, to identify additional 
opportunities for investment and sector growth. Such a measure would provide very 
valuable analysis in a time of increasing demand for economic and social service 
solutions to help address society’s critical social and economic problems. Providing 
an accurate empirical analysis of the economic impact of cooperatives could point the 
way towards adopting future, successful cooperative business strategies. Since the 
components of the economic impact of cooperatives are complex, generating such a 
measure, especially at the national level, will be challenging.  
 
Consequently; the purpose of this paper is to discuss the socio-economic 
determinants of the performance of the new land cooperatives. 
 
II- Theoretical Background:  
Strength of the Sapiro and Nourse ideas is in specifying objectives and 
organizational structures for cooperatives that address the concerns of agricultural 
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producers in a context of achieving a public interest role. In both schools of thought, 
cooperatives provide some balancing of market power, whether affecting the terms of 
trade for an industry-wide commodity, the Sapiro School, or in stimulating 
competition in specific markets, the Nourse School. In their conceptions, cooperatives 
capture a larger share of industry earnings for the membership, but additionally, 
contribute to market or industry efficiency. In other words, their philosophies of 
cooperation were grounded in a public interest perspective, as legislatively recognized 
in the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922.  
 
Sapiro and Nourse made major contributions to the practical problems of 
achieving member commitment and cohesive organizations. Yet, subsequent 
cooperative thought moved further into examining and modeling key facets of internal 
organization, developing a more coherent theory of agricultural cooperation. Over the 
years since Sapiro and Nourse, there has been some shift in emphasis from concern 
with the external effects of organization to the internal or micro aspects of organizing 
and sustaining cooperation. The advent of farm price support programs may have 
placed some of the interest in the public policy role of cooperatives on the back 
burner. In part, agricultural economists have given their attention to understanding the 
issues of member commitment and efficient operations, as the cooperative movement 
matured and organizations confronted major changes in their industries. To some 
extent, too, the focus on internal aspects of organization in cooperative theory has 
reflected new directions in economics, and perhaps the influence of that profession's 
gradual division into macroeconomics for economy-wide coordination issues and a 
microeconomics that has widely adopted the approach of methodological 
individualism.  
 
An excellent framework for understanding coordination and the role of 
cooperatives in macro coordination was developed by James Shaffer, and he noted 
that this role "... deserves a good deal more attention" (1987).  
 
A major step in understanding the internal economics of cooperatives was 
made by Emelianoff in the 1940's, with a conception of the cooperative as a form of 
vertical integration (1948). Emelianoff''s attempt to construct a more comprehensive 
theory of cooperation is particularly notable for its focus on the structural and 
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functional relationship of members to their cooperative marketing organization that 
was latter picked up and refined by Robotaka (1947) and his cadre of students, such as 
Aresvik (1955). Emelianoff concluded that cooperatives represent an aggregate of 
economic units (members) and are not themselves acquisitive economic units. In other 
words, Emelianoff developed a conception of a cooperative as pure agency with 
members as principals.  
 
Phillips developed a model of output and pricing decisions as logically derived 
from the Emelianoff-Robotka vertical integration framework. He identified a decision 
rule for members to produce where their marginal costs equaled the cooperative's 
marginal revenue. However, several economists have pointed out the flaws in this 
model (Trifon, 1961; Sexton, 1984; Royer, 1994; and Staatz, 1994). Suboptimal 
earnings would result whenever a cooperative's operations are subject to either 
increasing or decreasing marginal costs, unless there were some ways that all 
members could coordinate their outputs, which Phillips left unspecified.  
 
Emelianoff, Robotka, and Phillips clarified the importance of a principal-agent 
relationship in understanding cooperatives. Although this relationship is too simplistic 
by itself to provide a comprehensive explanation of cooperative decision making and 
governance, effective member control consists of members carrying out their role as 
principals, represented by directors, with management functioning as their agents. In 
the Emelianoff, Robotka, and Phillips conception of a cooperative, the answer to the 
"benefits to whom" question is clear and unambiguous.  
 
Phillips carried the logic of vertical integration into defining all member 
dealings and relationships in strictly proportional terms. All contributions and benefits 
are received from and returned to members in an equal ratio or proportion. 
Governance is likewise based on member voting in proportion to patronage volume or 
use.  
 
The shortcomings of Phillip's output and pricing decision rules derived from 
the lack of having some form of a modified theory of the firm for cooperatives. By the 
1960's, Helmberger and Hoos filled this void and accomplished a re-working of 
agricultural cooperative theory. Analogous to the theory of the firm, cooperatives 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 14, September 2012 
 
228 
 
have an optimization objective, but it is to maximize benefits to members. In their 
model, a cooperative maximizes the per-unit value or average price by distributing all 
earnings back to members in proportion to their patronage volume or use.  
 
There are excellent discussions of the Helmberger-Hoos model, its 
contributions and comparisons with the work of Phillips in several reports and issues 
of the Journal of Cooperatives (Staatz, 1989; Staatz, 1994; Royer, 1994 and Rhodes, 
1995; Sexton, 1995). By providing a modified theory of the firm approach and 
analyzing short run and long run decisions, the Helmberger-Hoos model identified the 
incentives that can potentially exist for current members to limit the size of a 
cooperative's membership. Their model revealed potential conflicts of interest if 
management wants to expand a cooperative's volume in situations of decreasing 
returns. When such output expansion is based on new members, it diminishes 
earnings to the original or current membership. Hence, their model is both consistent 
with the reality of an independent decision responsibility by management in 
cooperatives and the existence of complex member control issues, that were missing 
in the Phillip's model.  
 
Several new directions in economic theory have emerged since the 1960's and 
some comments on the nature of these approaches are relevant to understanding many 
of the recent developments in agricultural cooperative theory and practice. Traditional 
economic analysis locates the existence of profit as primarily a function of market 
structure. Working with this assumption, economists traditionally tended to neglect 
the internal structure of incentives in organizations (Shoemaker, 1990). It is 
interesting to note that at the time Emelianoff was writing, there was a lack of an 
adequate theory of enterprise. In using an analogue method of reasoning, he needed 
such a definition and devoted the first part of his essay to developing a concept of 
enterprise, which provided a point of contrast for conceptualizing a cooperative.  
 
One of the advantages of applying a new institutionalist approach to 
agricultural cooperatives, or business firms in general, is the understanding it offers of 
organizational strategy. This method of analysis is applied by Sporleder to 
understanding recent trends of vertical coordination and strategic alliances in 
agriculture (Sporleder, 1992).  
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A strategic aspect of relevance to many agricultural producers is the problem 
of asset fixity or specificity, that may render them vulnerable to opportunistic 
behavior by product purchasing firms. Williamson and other economists using a new 
institutionalist approach, have identified this type of vulnerability as a rationale for 
vertical integration (Williamson, 1971). It is apparent that some cooperatives provide 
a response to this type of potential market failure.  
 
Olson worked along similar lines as Buchanan in clarifying how most public 
goods can only be defined for specific groups of people. In that context, a specific 
group achieves a cooperative gain from their coordinated or organized actions, with 
the public goods dimension being that no member can be denied access to the services 
that generate the joint gains. Of course, Olson's major objective in this work was to 
examine the problem of individual incentives to form cooperatives.  
 
Both Staatz and Sexton look back to Phillips as a progenitor of coalition modeling 
for agricultural cooperatives (Staatz, 1994; Sexton, 1986). The proportionality 
principle in Phillip's work, keeping an equal ratio of burden to benefit sharing across 
all members, is a stable coalition solution. In other words, no member has an 
incentive to seek a change in the distribution rules. However, Staatz and Sexton point 
out the operation of a unanimity rule in coalition solutions, and a Phillip's prescription 
for proportional voting would not be necessary or justified over a one-member, one-
vote procedure in this regard.  
 
Jeffrey S. Royer considers the neoclassical approach in which the value of 
products and the allocation of resources are determined by the costs of production and 
the tastes and preferences of consumers. Neoclassical theory relies on marginal 
analysis, in which the quantity of a product that is purchased or sold is based on the 
additional utility, revenue, or cost associated with the last unit. 
 
III- Literature review: 
 
A review of past and recent developments in cooperative literature is an 
opportunity to gain new perspectives on earlier works and renewed appreciation. 
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A challenge for the cooperative members is to remain the primary beneficiary 
of group action for which they originally organized and not become the "residual" 
claimant in the sense of crumbs left over after all other agent groups receive their due. 
This is particularly critical in organizations lacking firm board governance control and 
in instances where management continues to push for sales growth involving non-
member related business activity. It becomes even more critical when cooperatives 
develop large unallocated reserves based on this non-member business as noted by 
Royer (1992) and Staatz (1989) that represents a form of "collective" equity. 
Management invariably views this equity as the product of its rather than members' 
efforts. As noted by Staatz and Royer, there is a great potential for the character of 
cooperative organizations to change or be compromised in such situations, 
particularly in larger complex organizations.  
 
Some of these situations have even led to conversions to investor-owned 
firms( IOFs), or to members losing control through goal inversion in which 
maintaining the "corporate" values becomes more important than keeping the business 
oriented to members as primary beneficiaries. Allocation practices therefore become a 
central feature of effective cooperation just as governance practices are important in 
organizational control. Especially noteworthy in this respect are the efforts by 
Ag.First farm credit bank of Columbia, SC to emphasize patronage refunds to 
member borrowers as a reward for continued cooperative business with the 
cooperative banking system (Love, 1996).  
 
A primary reason for the organization of cooperatives by farmers has been 
perceived market failures. A conviction that the local farm supply was exploiting a 
monopoly position or that the network of livestock business market and dealers was 
hopelessly inefficient often has been the rationale for establishing a cooperative. 
 
Cooperatives may have increasingly important roles to continue to play in 
providing agricultural producers’ incentive with access to markets and an effective 
vehicle for capturing value-added. 
Cooperatives are necessary to provide farmers with market power and to preserve 
their access to markets. This suggests that farmer cooperatives are more likely to arise 
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and convey greater benefits to their members where: (a) Assets on both sides of the 
market are highly specialized and/or (b) product and factor markets are fragmented, 
leading to a divergence between the values of the asset in its current use and its value 
in alternative uses. It also suggests that cooperatives will tend to be more prominent in 
declining markets than in expanding markets because in declining markets the long-
term consequences to farmers' trading partners of acting opportunistically are less 
severe than in expanding markets, in which the threat of entry of competing firms is 
higher. John M. Staatz* 
 
Cooperative firms may offer certain advantages over IOFs during the early stages 
of agricultural specialization. Farmer-stockholders have fewer incentives to act 
opportunistically toward their own cooperative firm than they do toward an IOF 
(provided that their return from the cooperative is contingent on their continued 
patronage); therefore, the cooperative firm has more of an incentive than an IOF to 
invest in training farmers in new production techniques. 
 
Farmers also may vertically integrate via cooperative firms to internalize 
externalities imposed on them by their trading partners. On the output side, farmers' 
trading partners may pay insufficient attention to maintaining the quality of farm 
products, particularly highly perishable ones, as they move through the marketing 
system, thereby depressing farm-level demand for these products. On the input side, 
farmers may have an incentive to integrate backward when they have no simple way 
of ascertaining the quality of purchased inputs, such as by simple inspection or by 
relying on the sellers' reputation. Particularly in the early stages of the 
industrialization of agriculture, when purchased inputs are just becoming important in 
farming and input suppliers' reputations are not well established, farmers may have a 
strong incentive to integrate vertically via cooperative firms to assure input quality. 
 
Farmers also may have an incentive to integrate vertically to provide themselves 
with goods and services that no IOF has an incentive to produce due to their public 
good nature. This is particularly true of the "competitive yardstick" services of farmer 
cooperative firms, the benefits of which accrue not to the cooperative firm as such but 
to the farmer-members as historically there has been much acceptance of E. G. 
Nourse's dictum that the goal of the cooperative is to serve as a competitive yardstick- 
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-a goad to investor-owned firm (IOF) competitors to keep their costs and profits in 
line. (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig).  
 
A contestable market is the one that is easily entered by new competitors. A 
perfectly contestable market has two characteristics: (1) Entrants have no 
disadvantages on either the cost or the demand sides as compared to the incumbents 
and (2) exit can be costless if the entrant were to find the market unprofitable. 
The implications are obvious. In markets in which entrants can pounce on above-
competitive profits or inefficient cost structures, those types of market failures cannot 
persist. Degree of market concentration does not matter if the incumbents must 
operate in fear of being overrun by numerous entrants.  
 
Its market failures arise either from lack of competition or from the inherent 
uncertainty of future events. Thus, in perfectly contestable markets, there is no special 
need or opportunity for cooperatives, as it appears that a perfectly contestable market 
must have virtually no product differentiation, the incumbents must have no cost 
advantage due to secret or patented processes or sole access to scarce resources. 
 
Without significant sunk costs, the entrant is freer to switch rather than 
continue to fight. Incumbents find it impossible to defend above-competitive profits 
from the hit-and-run tactics of the completely mobile entrant. On the other hand, if 
there will be an important sunk costs, an entrant must assess the risks of taking on 
incumbents who may choose to fight. Incumbents can likely protect some extra profits 
from less mobile would-be aggressors, because the latter realize that the post-entry 
environment might be so inhospitable as to prevent the recovery of their sunk costs. 
 
How well do the markets for agricultural commodities and farm supplies fit 
the conditions for perfectly contestable markets? Product differentiation does play a 
rather limited role in many agricultural markets because of the homogeneous nature of 
farm commodities and some farm inputs. Patents and the high costs of R and D deter 
entry into the manufacture of many farm chemical pesticides and heavy farm 
machinery but are not important in many other farm supplies. Fixed costs appear quite 
pervasive in both manufacture and distribution of supplies and in commodity 
marketing. However, fixed costs are not necessarily sunk, so generalizations about 
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sunk costs should be made cautiously. There is likely a continuum within agricultural 
markets with a few markets that are quite contestable (very low barriers to entry and 
exit), a few markets that have high barriers to entry and exit, and most markets 
somewhere in between. 
 
The likely least contestable markets- the manufacture of tractors and complex 
equipments and pesticides- are markets that cooperatives have not been able to enter. 
Ironically, the easiest markets for cooperatives to enter are the most contestable ones- 
in which cooperatives have the least to offer as competitive yardsticks. Historically, 
the economic accomplishments of cooperatives have been greatest in those markets of 
moderate barriers—where the rewards have been worth seeking and have not been so 
protected that cooperatives could not achieve them. Some parts of agriculture are 
more vulnerable to even short-run exercise of market power than are others. 
Producers of highly perishable commodities are especially vulnerable to even 
temporary exploitation of market power by buyers. Consequently, cooperatives have 
been important in fluid milk handling for example. 
 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig also introduce the concept of a "sustainable" 
industry structure. That is the set of firms that can supply most economically the 
desired industry output at a competitive price. Included are the requirements that each 
firm be at equilibrium and that there exist no incentive for entry.  
 
Sustainability is a necessary condition for equilibrium in a perfectly 
contestable market. However, in markets that are imperfectly contestable, 
sustainability is not a necessary condition for equilibrium. For example, an efficient 
set of firms may enjoy higher-than-competitive profits behind an effective barrier to 
entry. Even an inefficient set of firms may do the same. Obviously, there are limits to 
the size of the profits and/or the degree of inefficiency that any given entry barrier can 
protect. While there is no necessity for sustainability in many real-world markets in 
which cooperatives may operate, the concept is useful in exploring various market 
possibilities for cooperatives. 
 
Under certain conditions, a cooperative is the most desirable monopoly 
(monopsony) in this type of agricultural market. By the imperfectly contestable 
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assumption, the incumbent is not disciplined completely by potential entrants; it has 
some leeway to be inefficient and/or to enjoy above-competitive profits. If the 
cooperative monopoly can match the efficiency of the IOF, then it will benefit both 
consumers and farmers more than would an IOF monopoly. The reasons are argued in 
another paper (Rhodes 1983).  
 
To summarize the argument: Much of above-competitive earnings of the 
cooperative go to farmer-members and the latter tend to respond with larger output, 
benefiting consumers. This view is opposite the pessimistic scenario that a 
cooperative provides the direction that makes farmers into an effective output-
controlling cartel. That scenario assumes that the cooperative can direct farmers and 
that all farmers are ready to go along with a cartel so that it has no free riders. Neither 
assumption is likely to be met. 
Thus a cooperative monopoly may be socially desirable provided it is as efficient as 
an IOF counterpart. If the cooperative is substantially less efficient, the IOF may be 
socially more desirable. 
Market failure has been the traditional incentive for the organization of a 
cooperative. The reasons already have been developed as to why sunk costs give 
pause to the prudent challenger. These reasons apply more strongly to an IOF than to 
a cooperative. A challenger fears being met by reduced margins--the farm supply 
retailers start selling at lower prices and margins or the elevators start paying farmers 
more for grain and suffering reduced margins. These reactions to an entering IOF may 
mean substantial operating losses for an entrant and eventually an abandonment of its 
sunk capital. In contrast, these reactions to a farmer cooperative would help farmers 
as buyers or sellers even more than they hurt the margins of the cooperative. Farmers 
can well afford to subsidize the operations of the cooperative that has become such an 
effective competitive yardstick.  
 
Thus the cooperative challenger logically has less fear about incumbent 
reactions than does the IOF challenger. Cooperative members’ attitude may vary by 
the commodity produced. Those producers of perishables may count their 
vulnerability so high that they take the long view. 
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Suppose that a cooperative has successfully become the only firm in this 
market. It is easy to visualize some farmers organizing a second cooperative in the 
name of competition **to keep the cooperative management on its toes." Such an 
effort would be wasteful of resources because only one firm is sustainable in this 
market. However, some members may benefit from inter cooperative competition if it 
can be maintained. 
 
In sum, provided the cooperative suffers no inefficiencies because it is a cooperative, 
it is socially desirable that it be the firm in natural monopoly markets. If entry barriers 
are too high, a cooperative may not be able to enter. However, a cooperative has some 
advantages as an entrant. If the cooperative is one of two or more incumbents in a 
natural monopoly market, it is a bit more likely to emerge as the sole survivor. 
Social Service vs. Economic Philosophy of Cooperation:  
From a sociological perspective, there exist some conceptual and practical 
dilemmas that occur within the theory and practice of the cooperative movement and 
cooperative organizations that define differing orientations between the social and 
economic philosophies of cooperation. They include: 1) meaning versus service, 2) 
efficiency versus democracy, and 3) bureaucratic logic versus cooperative logic. At 
least three purposes of economic organizations can be identified; respectively, making 
profits, providing services, and realizing meaning. Their predominance and mix tend 
to vary both across and within organizations.  
Exemplar organizations tend to range along a continuum from investment oriented 
firms (IOFs) at the profits end, to the Kibbutz at the life meaning end. Cooperative 
organizations can be found at different locations on the continuum, with a 
predominance located within the service purpose, i.e. a focus on serving the greatest 
numbers of people over the longest period of time (Craig , 1993; Nadeau and 
Thompson, 1996). Most farm input and service cooperatives fall into this spot on the 
continuum. Agricultural marketing cooperatives tend to be found between the service 
and profit purpose orientation, with new generation cooperatives attempting to 
preserve earnings benefits for defined membership over time. The life meaning 
purpose at the other end of the continuum gives much greater focus to participation 
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and democratic process. Cooperative organizations typically contain elements of all 
three of these tendencies.  
 
In short there are several interrelated polemic themes that emerge out of the 
philosophy and theory of cooperation and the cooperative movement; as well as from 
the practice of cooperation as realized in organizations functioning to meet internal 
goals within a socio-economy. Organization for service or meaning/participation is a 
central dilemma that is found internationally. The predominance of each tendency 
varies across types of cooperative organizations as well as within organizations. North 
American agricultural input cooperatives are primarily service cooperatives, while 
conventional agricultural marketing cooperatives have a service orientation but with 
an increased emphasis on earnings. Given a competitive market place, efficiency 
criteria tend to drive organizational form toward bureaucratic models, and 
paradoxically away from cooperative logic form. When participation declines and 
organizations tend toward greater centralization of decision making (bureaucratic 
logic), it becomes increasingly difficult to recognize differences in cooperative 
behavior from investor oriented firm behavior ( IOF) and cooperative character can be 
lost. However, to act without recognition of market imperatives (need for earnings) 
can also result in the loss of cooperative presence.  
This dilemma explains in large measure the root differences between the 
social and economic philosophies of cooperation. Social philosophers emphasize 
democratic control in the form of one-person, one-vote as the cardinal principle of 
cooperation (Lambert, 1963). Economic philosophers on the other hand emphasize the 
distribution of benefits in proportion to use as the cardinal principle. These 
differences have been frequently articulated by cooperative leaders like Bergland and 
Voorhis (1975), who feel the service and participatory end of the continuum, are lost 
in cooperatives that strictly advocate a "bottom line" orientation.  
 
IV- Methodological Procedures: 
Sampling Design: The study was performed to explore the socio-economic 
determinants of the performance of the new land cooperatives .The study focuses into 
two governorates Alexandria and elbehira, whereas Alexandria has 3 main 
cooperative regions including 21 cooperatives, and elbehira has 7cooperative regions 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 14, September 2012 
 
237 
 
including 53, thus the population of study contain 74 cooperatives (13 cooperatives 
were inactivated because of legal and institutional problem) therefore they were 
excluded accordingly the population of study . Hence; the entire population of study 
consists of 61 of top new land cooperatives.  
Measurements: The study exploited the performance of the new land cooperatives as 
dependent variable and socio-economic determinants are representing 11 independent 
variables: 
The dependent variable: The performance of the new land cooperatives was measured 
by using of the scale of ILO and DANIDA is formulating the cooperative 
performance as follows: 
 
Cooperative performance: 
1- Equity capital ratio. 
2- Reserve capital ratio. 
3- Return on total capital. 
4- Return on operating assets. 
5- Return on equity capital. 
6- Return on operating capital. 
 
The variable of performance of the new land cooperatives was measured by : the 
evaluation of progress at last three years, and 6 answers were designed as follows ; 
(no progress) , (the progress was less than 10%), ( from 10% to 20 %), ( from 20% to 
30%) , ( from 40% to 50 %) ,( more than 50%) , weighed from 1 to 6 respectively. 
 
 Socio- economic determinants: 
 
1- Goal attainment:  
A: Community development: clean water, electricity, drainage, housing, food 
supply. 
B: Facilitating the social organization services (local unit, extension center, local 
community unit, banks, health unit and governmental organizations.) 
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2- Self reliance ratio 
3- Activities of productive investment  
4- Increasing of marketing opportunities( local market and export)  and 
Increasing ( using ) the competitive ability of their members 
5- Minimizing the production cost 
6- Annual sales  
7- Cooperative technical support 
8- Development  and protecting of cooperatives resources (lands improvement, 
water rational utilization, modern water irrigation systems, desalination 
programs and land quality adjustment) 
9- Finance of productive projects (industrial, agricultural, commercial, secondary 
services{ transportation, storage, grading and containing, packaging }sales 
units and small business projects) 
10- Training and skills improvement 
11- Logistics and communication 
 
The all items of independent variables were measured by formulated answers; 
strongly agree, agree neutral, disagree and strongly disagree, weighed from 5 to 1 
respectively. 
Data collection: The secondary data was collected form the administrative records of 
governmental authorities. And the questionnaires were pre-tested and collected by 
personal interviews from January to march 2010. 
V- Results 
 
The descriptive analysis for the cooperatives performance is revealing that: the 
performance of 27 cooperatives (representing 44% from the sample) was low, the 
performance of 31 productive cooperative (51%) was moderate, and the performance 
of 3 of studied cooperatives was high (5%). The performance of the majority of 
studied cooperatives is addressed between the low and moderate performance which 
is clarifying the need to an integrated action plans to develop the current productivity 
and to overcome the economic, organizational and social barriers and obstacles. 
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Table  (1) cooperatives  performance
27 44.3 44.3 44.3
31 50.8 50.8 95.1
3 4.9 4.9 100.0
61 100.0 100.0
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Discriminant analysis: the discriminant analysis is a technique for classifying a 
set of observations into predefined classes. The purpose is to determine the class of an 
observation based on a set of variables known as predictors or input variables. The 
model is built based on a set of observations for which the classes are known. This set 
of observations is sometimes referred to as the training set. Based on the training set, 
the technique constructs a set of linear functions of the predictors, known as 
discriminant functions, such that   
L = b1x1 + b2x2 + … + bnxn + c , where the b's are discriminant coefficients, 
the x's are the input variables or predictors and c is a constant.  
 
The table shown below was generated by the selected Univariate ANOVAs. 
This indicates whether there is a statistically significant difference among the 
dependent variable means (studied group) for each independent variable. Only 
x2,x4,x6,x7,x9 and x11 are statistically significant. The Wilks' Lambda is a statistical 
criterion that is used to add or remove variables from the analysis. 
 
 
 
  
  
giS F 
siliW'  
aLabLaL 
 
0.484 0.735 0.975 X1 
0.000 13.350 0.685 X2 
0.747 0.293 0.990 X3 
0.000 9.159 0.760 X4 
Table (2) Tests of Equality of Group Means          
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0.421 0.879 0.971 X5 
0.000 13.921 0.676 X6 
0.010 5.024 0.852 X7 
0.899 0.106 0.996 X8 
0.000 12.931 0.692 X9 
0.959 0.042 0.999 X10 
0.000 14.658 0.664 X11 
 
 
The next two tables shown below gives the percentage of the variance 
accounted for by the yielded discriminant function. The significant of the function is 
also shown; whereas the generated wilks, lambda was significant (Chi- square value 
was 23.728) 
 
 
Table (3) Eigen value 
Function Eigen value % of variance Cumulative% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 0.505
a 
78.3 78.3 0.579 
 
Table (4) Wilks' Lambda 
giS ad 
Chi-square 
 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
 
Test of 
Function(s) 
.000 2 23.728 46..0 1 
 
Table (5) the standardized Canonical Discriminant analysis 
Independent variables Sig. 
X11 0.8112** 
X2 0.672** 
X6 0.6131** 
X9 0.597** 
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X4 0.415* 
X7 0.368* 
X10 0.217 
X3 0.194 
X8 0.131 
X5 0.102 
X1 0.007 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Like those of other nonprofit organizations, agricultural cooperatives in new lands are 
now confronting new emerging needs and challenges from farmer-members and 
markets caused by national and global changes in the 21
st 
century. Farmer-members 
want not only to sell their products as fast as possible but also with high economic 
returns. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the cooperatives to assist their members 
Table (6) Classification Results a 
11 16 0 27 
5 26 0 31 
1 1 1 3 
40.7 59.3 .0 100.0 
16.1 83.9 .0 100.0 
33.3 33.3 33.3 100.0 
DEP 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Count 
% 
Original 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
62.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified. a.  
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not only in selling their products but also at good prices. Furthermore, the new market 
economies in which agricultural cooperatives operate bring about new types of 
consumers who demand high-quality products at reasonable prices, and prefer healthy 
and chemical-free food at international standards. They want to know the origin of the 
foods they buy, and whether they are grown through socially acceptable and 
environment-friendly methods. These phenomena offer both new opportunities and 
also threats to agricultural cooperatives. 
Although most of agricultural cooperatives in new lands remain confined to their 
main functions like distribution of credit and fertilizers, and procurement of farm 
products, some changes and modifications should be designed at agricultural 
cooperatives to transform themselves and implement new strategies in this new 
economic environment. The innovative practices as a new direction of agricultural 
cooperatives in new lands are as follows: 
o Electronic commerce and use of Internet. E-commerce is a new way of 
commercializing products. It offers marketing of products and services via the 
Internet. The new lands agricultural cooperatives should be supported to set up 
their web sites for e-commerce of their products. 
o Responding to the needs of the members thereby encouraging member 
participation. 
o Providing technical support in areas of marketing and supply. 
o Enhancing higher economic returns to members through value-addition. 
o Delivering adequate and timely credit facilities leading to higher productivity. 
o Offering a high level of market information enabling better business decisions. 
o Provide production and consumption loans to members at reasonable rate of 
interest. 
o Encourage savings among members by promoting savings deposits. 
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